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ABSTRACT     Philosophers frequently  struggle with the relation of metaphysics to the everyday 
world, with its practical value, and with its relation to empirical science.  This paper distinguishes 
several different models of the relation between philosophical ontology and applied (scientific) 
ontology that have been advanced in the history of philosophy.  Adoption of a strong participation 
model for the philosophical ontologist in science is urged, and requirements and consequences of 
the participation model are explored.  This approach provides both a principled view and 
justification of  the role of the philosophical ontologist in contemporary empirical  science as well 
as guidelines for integrating philosophers and philosophical contributions into the practice of 
science. 
 
Introduction 
Metaphysicians, when explaining or justifying their calling, tend to be a mournful and defensive 
lot while at the same time extolling the intellectual, moral, and spiritual virtues of metaphysics and 
its practice.  A classic example is found in Russell's The Problems of Philosophy where he argues 
that philosophy as a discipline is not quite as fruitless as it may appear: 
 
Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge.... But it cannot 
be maintained that philosophy has had any very great measure of success in its 
attempts to provide definite answers to its questions....  It is true that this is 
partly accounted for by the fact that as soon as definite knowledge concerning 
any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and 
becomes a separate science.... 
 
Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its 
questions since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather 
for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our 
conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish 
the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all 
because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, 
the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the 
universe which constitutes its highest good.  (Russell, 2010,  p. 98)1 
 
This shadows, in somewhat more flowery prose, Hume's sentiments in the Enquiry when he writes 
that 
 
                                                     
1    While Russell speaks  here generally of philosophy rather than more narrowly of 
metaphysics, and although the focus in The Problems of Philosophy is intended to be primarily on 
epistemology, the context of his remarks at this point  makes it clear that he intends them to 
encompass metaphysics and (even more specifically)  metaphysical and ontological  questions 
raised and settled in the empirical sciences. 
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And though a philosopher may live remote from business, the genius of 
philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself 
throughout the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and 
calling.  (Hume 2007, p. 7) 
 
A related theme, that metaphysics is, or involves, a specific “way of thinking”, is expressed to 
some degree by both Hume and Russell, and by Richard Taylor in the opening chapters of his 
Metaphysics where he (like Russell) urges the view that metaphysics yields not knowledge, but 
understanding and wisdom.  Taylor sees the practice of metaphysics as centered on problems — 
problems that arise from our interactions with, and comtemplations of, the world as we attempt to 
understand the “data” (his word) that we encounter within it.  He echoes Russell in saying of 
metaphysics that 
 
Metaphysics, in fact, promises no knowledge of anything.  If knowledge itself is 
what you seek, be grateful for empirical science, for you will never find it in 
metaphysics.  (Taylor 1992, pp. 6-7) 
 
These views are of metaphysics writ broadly and large — while at the same time exhibiting an 
undercurrent of defensiveness and insecurity.  The situation for admitted metaphysicians is hardly 
improved by attacks from fellow philosophers, including Hume himself (“cast it into the flames”) 
and the early Carnap (“alleged statements in this domain are entirely meaningless”), and perhaps 
the fear of sterility or meaninglessness is what historically has driven metaphysicians to draw such 
a stark line of demarcation between themselves and scientists:  if you are not striving to attain 
knowledge, then you can hardly be faulted for your failure in attaining it. 
 
Still, some philosophers feel that the connection between philosophical ontology and the 
ontologies of science is more immediate and direct. In his New Essays on Human Understanding, 
Leibniz remarks that 
 
The art of ranking things in genera and species is of no small importance and 
very much assists our judgment as well as our memory. You know how much it 
matters in botany, not to mention animals and other substances, or again ‘moral’ 
and ‘notional’entities as some call them. Order largely depends on it, and many 
good authors write in such a way that their whole account could be divided and 
subdivided according to a procedure related to genera and species. This helps 
one not merely to retain things, but also to find them. And those who have laid 
out all sorts of notions under certain headings or categories have done something 
very useful.  (Leibniz 1996, pp. 179-180) 
   
The very useful thing to which Leibniz refers is of course one of the primary contributions that the 
philosophical ontologist can make to the sciences.  This consists in the creation of a set of 
“abstract ideas” (let us think of them as ontological categories) together with a set of names by 
which they may be referenced, and a system in which these categories are arrayed by means of 
relations (some of them hierarchical).  Moreover, in the context of discussing the value of such 
categorization in geometry, Leibniz remarks with some prescience that 
   
To these two kinds of arrangement [synthetic and analytic] we must add a third. 
It is classification by terms, and really all it produces is a kind of Inventory.   
The latter could be systematic, with the terms being ordered according to certain 
categories shared by all peoples, or it could have an alphabetical order within the 
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accepted language of the learned world. ...  And there is even more reason why 
these inventories should be more useful in the other sciences, where the art of 
reasoning has less power, and they are utterly necessary in medicine above all.  
(Leibniz 1996, p. 382) 
   
Thus has Leibniz, from a distance of more than 300 years, characterized much of the work being 
done today in the domain of informatics, and especially medical informatics — mentioning 
explicitly the value of systematic classification in domains that we would now think of as 
knowledge representation, knowledge management, information retrieval, and inferencing — and 
Leibniz sees it as the work of the philosopher. 
 
In a similar vein, Peirce comments that 
 
The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the same thing, all 
the ideas that seek expression, is the most stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody 
but the most accomplished logician must break down in it utterly; and even for 
the strongest man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and 
faculty.  (Peirce 1897) 
 
The view here is consistent and uniform:  that the philosopher's job is the construction of a system 
(or of systems) of categories to be used in describing and understanding the world around us.  And 
Leibniz explicitly recognizes the value of ontology in the sciences, holding that it is in fact “utterly 
necessary” in the science of medicine. 
 
More recently Thomas Hofweber has taken up a theme similar to Russell's and Taylor's in his 
“Ambitious, yet modest, metaphysics” (Hofweber 2009).   He is concerned about “how to defend 
ontology as a philosophical discipline,” particularly against what is fundamentally the Russellian 
view that the questions that metaphysics attempts to answer are, in the long run, better answered 
by the sciences and that therefore (Hofweber) “There is nothing left to do for philosophy ...”.  To 
counter this lament, Hofweber turns his attention to ontology (as a particularly well-delimited sub-
domain of metaphysics) and advances a proposal concerning what the role of the ontologist should 
be, and what the value of that role is. 
 
Hofweber believes that we may “save metaphysics” and more particularly “our beloved discipline 
of ontology”; and that the way to do this is to convert the ontologist to a linguistic analyst who 
will settle existence claims in “overlap cases” (where both the sciences and philosophy “have an 
interest in the same subject matter”).  The settlement of such a claim as “Numbers exist.” will then 
be accomplished by the proper examination of number talk in natural language; and this will yield 
a determination as to whether number terms are used in an internal (non-referential) sense — in 
which case numbers will be seen not to exist — or an external (referential) sense — in which case 
numbers will be seen as existing.  I think there is much wrong with this view and approach of 
Hofweber's, but for our immediate concerns it is sufficient to note that it is an essentially defensive 
position that appears more timid than ambitious and seeks to reduce the risk that the philosopher 
will encroach on the territory of the scientist.  In doing this, the Hofweberian philosopher is to 
retreat from ontology to meta-ontology and concede that philosophical ontology lacks relevance to 
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other disciplines; and this approach ensures that ontology as practiced by the philosopher will be 
of interest only to other philosophers.2 
 
A different course is taken by Dale Jacquette in which he carefully distinguishes between pure 
philosophical ontology and applied scientific ontology.  For Jacquette, pure philosophical ontology 
is characterized by the fundamental question of what it means for something to exist — of “the 
precise meaning of the words ‘being', ‘to be', ‘exist', ‘existence`, to be ‘real', ‘actual', ‘present', 
‘manifest', and like cognates.”3  Answering this question, for Jacquette, necessarily precedes 
investigating any questions of applied scientific ontology and we must have this answer before we 
can proceed in any intelligible way with the questions raised by scientific ontology.  Applied 
scientific ontology, on the other hand, is concerned with building a “conceptual model” of what it 
means for something to exist, recommending a preferred existence domain (numbers, sets, atoms, 
fields, genes, ...), and applying the definition of being that emerges from pure philosophical 
ontology.  Jacquette urges that only by achieving such a definition can coherent analyses and 
comparisons of scientific ontologies be made, and that such a definition is a necessary condition 
for rendering the work of the scientific ontologist intelligible.  But although Jacquette believes that 
“The study of ontology belongs squarely to philosophy” and sees successful ontology as being an 
“integration” of philosophical ontology and scientific ontology where the latter is responsible for 
“grafting an appropriate preferred existence domain onto a satisfactory analysis of the concept of 
                                                     
2  This is most evident in Hofweber's discussion of the domain of ontology and the 
existence of numbers  (Hofweber 2009,  pp. 283-284).  Here, it becomes clear that in the case of 
what Hofweber sees as the interesting philosophical questions “left open by science”, these are left 
open because science simply does not care about their answers — or at least the answers that a 
philosopher would provide.  No matter what answer the philosopher may offer to the question “Do 
numbers exist?”, this will be of  no consequence to the scientist. David Manley makes a related 
point in his “Introduction” to Chalmers 2009 when he says  “On Hofweber's view, the claims of 
metaphysics do not conflict with the claims forthcoming from such other disciplines.” (Chalmers, 
et al, p. 35)  But if they do not conflict in such cases, they cannot be relevant to (or certainly 
cannot contribute to) those other disciplines and so will be of no interest to them — a somewhat 
odd incongruity if the original point was to deal with cases which overlapped in the sense that both 
scientists and philosophers have an interest in them, and to deal with them in part because of such 
an overlap of interest.  This exposes a difficulty with Hofweber’s notion of overlap and the weight 
it must support in his proposal.    It can support that weight only if the overlap involves a shared 
interest or shared sense.  The only sense of “shared interest” here is that both the scientist and the 
philosopher would agree that a particular statement (e.g., “Protons exist”) is of interest.  But the 
degree of sharing appears to be purely syntactic (agreement that the truth of this sentence is of 
interest), and not semantic (agreement on the semantics or truth conditions whose satisfaction 
would render the sentence true) or pragmatic (what are the consequences of the truth or falsity of 
the sentence).  Thus the outcome of the philosopher’s game in such cases is of no value to the 
scientist.  If this is so, then Hofweber’s proposal appears to be that philosophers should attempt to 
save ontology by finding questions in which scientists will admit some interest, and then produce 
scientifically uninteresting and irrelevant answers to these questions.  This is indeed a modest 
proposal, but it is also conformant with the traditional view that the philosopher’s role, with 
respect to science, is that of a commentator who should risk no conflict. 
 
3  (Jacquette, 2002)  For the initial statement of the problems Jacquette seeks to address, 
and the distinctions to be employed, see pp. 1-11. 
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being”, it is not at all clear what the instrumental role of philosophical ontology in this task would 
be:  of precisely what the philosophical ontologist would affect in science and how this would be 
accomplished (cf. Jacquette 2002, pp. 275-280). 
  
In traditional philosophy (and in philosophy traditionally practiced by contemporary philosophers) 
there is then a general recognition of the importance of ontological questions in science together 
with widely held views that ontology (and hence the addressing of ontological questions) is an 
essentially philosophical task.  But philosophers seem to disagree strongly concerning whether 
there is a role for the philosopher on the scientific side of ontology, and there is little insight 
offered concerning exactly what this role is or precisely how it is to be played.  A number of 
different models are proposed of the relationship between science and philosophy, and between 
scientist and philosopher. 
 
Russell endorses what is fundamentally an evolution model in which, as science advances and 
fragments of philosophy break off  to form special sciences, ontological work (at least in a 
particular science) becomes the work of the scientist.  Such a model is also explicitly urged by 
Barry Smith (cf. Smith 2009)  who takes psychology to be a paradigm case of such evolution.  But 
in Smith's case — playing directly to the sort of fears expressed by Hofweber — he sees ontology 
itself breaking off as a special science.  A consequence of  this model is that the connection 
between the philosopher and scientist becomes obscure in the process of evolution and speciation, 
and at the very least there is a movement of certain philosophers and a certain domain out of 
philosophy and into either its own or another discipline. 
 
Hume embraces a rather vague diffusion model, and what is missing in this case is any hint of a 
mechanism by which the philosopher may affect science.  That the philosopher's work will have 
an effect in science then appears to be more an expression of faith than reason.  The same is true 
for the sort of grounding model proposed by Jacquette which argues for a strong logical 
connection between pure philosophical ontology and applied scientific ontology, but which again 
falls short of characterizing any practical mechanism by which the one may affect the other. 
 
Hofweber's approach may most charitably be described as acknowledging the accuracy of 
Russell’s evolution model while invoking an overlap model according to which philosophers may 
keep their hands in ontology to the degree that both scientists and philosophers are interested in a 
certain core of ontological questions and answers to them.  But there are some significant flaws in 
this view since the kind of interest had by philosophers in these questions (e.g., Hofweber's 
common example of “Numbers exist”) is quite different from the interest that scientists have in 
them,4  and again any way in which what the philosopher has to say would be of interest or 
relevance on the scientific side of an overlap case is left wholly obscure.  The questions that 
Hofweber finds to be of interest and to appear as overlap cases are ones whose answers (whatever 
these may be) will not contribute in any way to the progress of science. 
 
Finally, Leibniz and Peirce rather aggressively support a participation model according to which 
the work of the philosophical ontologist is directly relevant to that of the scientist.  But here again 
the details of any mechanism of participation remain absent.5 
                                                     
4   Jacquette certainly sees this difference quite clearly, and his distinction between pure 
philosophical ontology and applied scientific ontology is largely addressed to it. 
5  We can, however, perhaps take the examples of the lives and work of Leibniz and 
Peirce as illustrations of such participation. 
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In all this, what is left undetermined is exactly how the philosopher will affect the science, how 
what the philosopher does (which presumably is philosophy of one sort or another) can contribute 
to what the scientist does (which presumably is science), and by what process this contribution 
may be accomplished.  Are we to hope (as Hume seems to suggest) that scientists will read the 
abstract work of philosophers and somehow come to apply this to their scientific work in 
constructing and testing hypotheses and theories?  Or is there a more direct way, as Leibniz and 
Peirce suggest, in which philosophy and philosophers may influence science? 
 
1. Ontology, science, and data 
The customary view of the philosopher in relation to science is that of being a commentator on 
science, on the meaning (or “grounding”) of scientific claims and theories, and on the 
methodologies of science.  Such a perspective is compatible with the views of metaphysics 
discussed above (it is indeed expressed succinctly by Russell and is evident in Hofweber and 
Jacquette), and it essentially eliminates the philosopher from participating in science.  Philosophy, 
according to this view, helps us to understand science and how it works (or how it does not, in the 
cases where it does not or has not), and some portions of philosophy (e.g., logic, inductive logic, 
epistemology associated with statistics) may contribute in some way to the methodology of 
science, but the philosopher does not participate directly in the scientific enterprise.  Scientists do 
science;  philosophers do not. 
 
Historically, one of the forces driving a wedge between science and metaphysics (or more 
generally philosophy) was the development of technology in the late Middle Ages and 
Renaissance that allowed for the design and execution of more careful empirical investigations.  
This led to an enhanced ability of science to make more accurate and reliable predictions, which in 
turn led to complex conceptual schemes (scientific theories), supported by experiment, that 
enhanced this ability even more.  In short, the result was the “definite answers” and “knowledge 
itself” to which Russell and Taylor refer:  scientific knowledge. 
 
Some of this knowledge was incompatible with the views previously expressed by the “great 
thinkers” such as Aristotle, and thus unfortunately this trend resulted in confrontations (as in the 
case of Galileo) with other strong forces until a kind of armistice was declared in which science 
and philosophy were agreed to have distinct domains.  A consequence of this over time was a 
separation not simply of the disciplines of science and philosophy, but of scientists from 
philosophers in the sense that scientific work was done by scientists and philosophical work was 
done by philosophers.  While some scientists might be philosophically sophisticated and some 
philosophers scientifically astute, a definite division of labor and separation of methodologies 
arose that resulted in the extinction of the philosopher/scientist or “natural philosopher” of ages 
past.  This divide widened over the centuries as the volume and diversity of scientific knowledge 
increased dramatically, and science itself fragmented into an increasing number of sub-disciplines.  
It has left us with the view expressed by a number of philosophers that while ontology may be 
relevant in some way to science, the philosopher's work in ontology must remain pure and abstract 
while the scientist's needs and work — pertaining to what Jacquette at one point refers to as 
“motley existence requirements” (Jacquette 2002, p. 6) — are not the sort of thing that the 
philosopher has either a right or an interest in pursuing.  Can we retain such a view in the face of 
contemporary science? 
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When we look at the state of ontology today and its relation to science, a number of questions 
naturally arise.  To begin:  What has caused such a dramatic shift from ontological research in 
philosophy (where this has always been merely a sub-area of metaphysics with some interest to 
logicians, philosophers of language, and philosophers of science) to the substantially greater time 
and effort being devoted to ontological research (including funding, large research projects, 
publications, conferences, societies, and the creation of new journals) that appears to be largely, if 
not completely, outside of institutional philosophy and firmly within such domains as computer 
science, information science, and the various empirical sciences?  How have we come to a 
situation in philosophy where the editor of The Monist is giving talks on ontology titled (Smith 
2009)  “Why I Am No Longer a Philosopher”? 
  
Again, as was the case in the late Middle Ages and Renaissance, the answer rests on the advance 
of technology — this time in the form of digital computers.  But while digital computers have  
been with us for some time (at least since the 1940s), it is only within the last decades of the 
twentieth century that they acquired the capabilities to support the creation and use of what can 
only be thought of as large knowledge and inferencing systems.  The storage capabilities 
themselves have exploded; and as the cost of data storage has come down while access speed to 
the stored data has gone up, it has become trivially possible for scientists to move from collecting 
kilobytes (thousands of bytes) of data to collecting megabytes, gigabytes, terabytes, petabytes 
(thousands of trillions of bytes) and beyond — and to design sophisticated software methodologies 
and systems for extracting knowledge from such masses of data.  The availability of such data has 
resulted in vastly expanded horizons in scientific discovery for astronomers, chemists, physicists, 
and researchers in the biological and medical sciences. 
 
The change that advances in digital computation and related computer and information science 
(including algorithms, data structures, database systems, wide area networks, and artificial 
intelligence) have imposed on the practice of science is emphasized by considering that in 1944, 
near the end of “The Semantic Conception of Truth”, Tarksi attempts to defend his work against 
the objection that semantics (as he has developed it) is not applicable to the empirical sciences.  
After some hand-waving, reminiscent of Hume's remarks, about how abstract theories in general, 
and semantics in particular, may have indirect influences difficult to assess or predict, he concedes 
that semantics will not have any direct applications in “the natural sciences”: 
 
 It is perhaps unnecessary to say that semantics cannot find any direct 
applications in natural sciences such as physics, biology, etc.; for in none of 
these sciences are we concerned with linguistic phenomena, and even less with 
semantic relations between linguistic expressions and objects to which these 
expressions refer.  (Tarksi 1952, pp. 37-38) 
 
Viewed from our contemporary perspective some half-century later, this must be regarded with 
astonishment since semantic considerations have become central to the representation and analysis 
of scientific data through the use of large computer systems.  Tarski, it would appear, could not 
have been more wrong; but he also could not have foreseen the effect the combined 
hardware/software revolution would have on the practice of science.  Is there, or should there be, a 
similar effect on the practice — and teaching – of philosophy? 
 
2. Towards a participation model 
The collection, organization, and use of data, which lies now at the very heart of empirical science, 
cannot be accomplished without equally sophisticated systems of classification — which is to say 
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ontologies — integrated into the software systems that manage, analyze, and interpret the data.  
And ontologies, well and efficiently constructed, thereby serve as essential components in the 
engine of contemporary science.  If, as Richard Taylor suggests, metaphysics should be centered 
on problems in understanding the data of the world around us, then it is clear that metaphysicians 
should contribute to the understanding of the substantial amounts of data now within the domain 
of empirical science.  But how? 
 
This question may be answered, in the spirit of Leibniz and Peirce, by adopting a strong 
participation model regarding the relation between the philosophical ontologist and science.  Such 
a model is not incompatible with at least some other models of the relation between philosophical 
ontology and science, and in particular it is quite compatible with the diffusion model of Hume 
and even the overlap model of Hofweber — though it goes beyond these both in assigning 
responsibility to the philosopher for addressing certain ontological issues and in the significance 
and effect that philosophical ontology will have as a result.  It is at least somewhat incompatible 
with the evolution model of Russell and Smith in that it requires philosophers to assume that 
responsibility rather than abandon it to other disciplines and traditions. 
 
The participation model is also incompatible with the grounding model of Jacquette — not in the 
sense that it denies the importance of the sort of grounding that Jacquette sees as necessary, but in 
the sense that it denies the necessity of establishing such a grounding as a pre-condition of doing 
meaningful and successful ontology in a scientific context.  Jacquette feels quite strongly that the 
role of philosophical ontology is to answer “fundamental questions” of the meaning of “exists”, 
and that arriving at the “right answers” to metaphysical puzzles requires that “philosophical 
ontology precedes scientific ontology” (Jacquette 2002, pp. 275-276). 
  
In point of fact, science has done very well in the absence of a broadly accepted definition of 
“exists”, and we can continue to expect it to do so in the future.  What the philosophical ontologist 
has to contribute to science is not a single foundational definition, but rather methods, skills, and 
experience in constructing complex systems of entities, concepts, and languages.  The 
participation model I am advocating here is not one in which the philosopher brings to the 
scientific table  — as a pre-condition of participation  — an acceptable philosophical analysis of 
the concept of being to then be applied in the development of scientific ontologies (as Jacquette 
suggests), but rather the philosopher brings a set of concepts, skills, and methods that will both 
inform and be informed  by the development of such ontologies. 
 
Philosophers may indeed provide a grounding of fundamental concepts and terms (such as 
“exists”) in a systematic manner as Jacquette believes he has done.  Such an exercise may yield 
useful methods or principles that can be applied to the creation and analysis of ontologies in 
science.  But although such a grounding system (whose role is to provide justification and support 
for  a particular philosophical/scientific approach to ontology and ontologies)  may be of some 
pragmatic value in approaching applied ontology, a grounding model (whose role is to provide 
principles and guidance in developing applied ontologies) cannot serve as a unique or necessary 
guide to the philosopher’s participation in science. Science cannot, and will not, wait on the 
delivery of such a grounding system; and the philosophical ontologist should not withhold 
participation in science for lack of such a system (or in Jacquette’s case, in particular, lack of a 
definition of “exists”).  Science cannot wait for the completion (and presumed acceptance) of such 
a system prior to creating the “preferred existence domain” that is to be grafted onto that system 
and that it needs in order to progress. 
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Moreover, no one can doubt that in fact philosophers will produce (as they have produced) 
multiple grounding systems of this sort, some incompatible with others.  How, then, would the 
scientist choose which of these to employ as the foundation for the preferred existence domain to 
be created and grafted thereto?  It matters, since there almost certainly will be incompatibilities in 
grafting to different bases of this sort.  Such a concern is expressed by Colomb and Weber when 
they observe that 
 
We as information systems researchers are not central players in the effort to 
understand meaning – we must adopt and adapt theories of meaning from these 
researchers.  Since there are many different and strongly argued positions, if we 
select one and build on it, we run a serious risk of making the wrong choice.  
(Colomb and Weber 1998, p. 213) 
  
And this indicates that the role of the philosophical ontologist in science (certainly from the 
perspective of the participation model) is not to serve up a complex metaphysical theory as the 
starting point for the construction of a scientific ontology, but rather to work together with 
scientists in applying effective methods and principles (based, perhaps, on one or more such 
theories, even if these are of an incomplete or fragmentary nature) to specific problems facing the 
scientist.  In taking a more pragmatic approach of this sort, the participation model rejects any 
requirement for the completion and acceptance of a grounding theory prior to the philosophical 
ontologist’s participation in the work of applied scientific ontology.6 
 
Filling out the details of this participation model requires answering several additional questions 
concerning the types of problems to be addressed, the warrant or authority that the philosopher has 
in addressing them, and what the consequences of all this are for the practice and teaching of 
applied ontology from a philosophical perspective. 
 
3. Philosophical problems in applied ontology 
What are some examples, in the context of scientific ontology, of questions or problems that can 
require philosophical attention?  And how do these determine the nature and scope of the 
philosopher's participation?  Limitations of space prohibit an exhaustive, or even very detailed, 
description of the problems in scientific ontology that require the skills and experience of the 
philosophically trained, but we may at least sketch an overview of the types of such problems and 
mention briefly one or two specific examples. 
 
There are, in fact, two broad types of contribution that the philosopher may make.  The first of 
these involves the design, analysis, and criticism of specific ontologies; and it falls under the 
descriptions of such system-building activity as seen in Leibniz and Peirce.  It thus involves 
primarily the application of various methods and criteria to create, to improve, and to evaluate 
ontologies.  Here the philosopher works with scientists either to create a new ontology in a 
particular domain, or to modify, extend, or repair an existing ontology.  For example, the Disease 
Ontology (see Chisholm et al 2008) was created in 2003 in an attempt to provide a hierarchical 
                                                     
6    There is an associated danger here that insistence on a grounding model and grounding 
system invites, and that is the temptation for the philosopher to become ideological, dogmatic, and 
coercive in the appeal to such a system, leading to a kind of philosophical arrogance that steps 
beyond the bounds of the genuine authority the philosopher has in the domain of applied scientific 
ontology.   For an example of criticisms of cases in which philosophical ideology can be counter-
productive in this way, see Merrill 2010a and 2010b. 
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representation of human diseases and to describe the relations among the diseases so represented 
and diseases and medical conditions in other ontologies and terminologies. It has been revised 
once and is currently undergoing additional active revision in order both to eliminate problems 
that were discovered in its content and organization , and to make it more compatible with the 
Unified Medical Language System (UMLS) (see NLM 2010a).  
 
More recently, some questions concerning the assimilation of the SNOMED CT ontology into the 
UMLS have been raised; and these involve issues in the representation of one ontology in another, 
the nature of concepts as these appear in concept-based ontologies (such as SNOMED and the 
UMLS), and relations of synonymy or similarity in meaning that may be used to establish a 
correspondence between ontologies.  An examination of such cases quickly demonstrates that the 
issues are not of a purely technical nature (that could be addressed within computer or information 
science), but rather involve fundamental philosophical questions concerning the relation of one 
conceptual scheme or ontology to another, how concepts should be characterized, and how two 
concepts may be related to one another if they appear in disparate complex systems.7 
  
The second type of contribution that the philosopher as ontologist may make to science falls 
within the methodological arena and may arise from our noticing that ontology-specific tasks often 
assume the existence of principles to be used in completing them. As an example, our task might 
be to evaluate two ontologies purportedly comprehending the same domain, and with the goal of 
deciding whether to accept both, accept one but not the other, reject both, or merge the two into a 
single more acceptable or useful ontology.  But if we are to do this in other than an ad hoc 
manner, we need some principles to guide our analysis and decision.  Failure to find such a set of 
principles on which to base ontological analyses will result in any decisions or recommendations 
being a continuing source of dispute, and this in turn will delay or inhibit scientific progress.8 
                                                     
7  NLM (2010b)   Gail Larkin of WebMD raises her question in “Any commentary on 
synonymy/mapping of SNOMED CT to ICD10PCS concepts?” on June 1, 2010; and Kevin 
Coonan of the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute posts a related concern as “General questions about 
mapping SNOMED (and other terminologies) into the UMLS Metathesaurus” on June 15, 2010.  
For a thorough treatment of the related notions of concepts and synonymy in the UMLS, see 
Merrill 2009. 
 
8  One illustration of this occurred in January, 2008 in a discussion and dispute on the 
Open Biomedical Ontologies discussion list (Ashburner et al 2008)  pertaining to principles being 
proposed for the inclusion of an ontology in the OBO Foundry (basically a library of “approved” 
ontologies). 
   
 The principle in dispute was one according to which the Foundry would permit the 
inclusion of at most one ontology for a particular domain (e.g., biosequences), and that any 
subsequent competing ontology would need to be “merged” with that one.  The dispute then 
centered around precisely what “merge” meant and whether, both in principle and in practice, such 
merging was always possible.  This in turn led to questions concerning the concept of 
“overlapping” among ontologies, what it meant to say that one ontology was “better” than another 
(in a given domain), and criticism of the lack of clear definitions or accounts of these concepts.  At 
one point a participant suggested that the problem would be clarified when everyone realized that 
“Ontology domains overlap when terms in the ontology have the same meaning”.  But it was not 
generally accepted that reduction of ontology overlap to sameness of meaning (not to mention the 
use/mention confusion this suggestion involved) lent the desired degree of clarity to the 
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These potential contributions can be seen to fall within a range of different types of ontological 
problems, each of which is philosophical in nature, and most of which manifest themselves both as 
problems pertaining to specific ontologies and to methodological considerations in ontology.  The 
problems include problems of content (what should be in the ontology and what should not), 
problems of organization (how are elements of the ontology related to one another and to scientific 
data), complexity and its reduction, problems of individuation, problems of commensurability (of 
one ontology with another), relations of an ontology to its representation language(s) and to the 
observational language of data, and problems of the adequacy and validation of ontologies (what 
does “adequacy” even mean, and how and in what sense may an ontology be validated for use in 
such areas as biomedicine or drug safety?). 
 
A significant set of problems, for example,  surrounds questions pertaining to the comparability 
and commensurability of scientific ontologies, and the possibility of “matching” or “mapping” one 
ontology to another.  Currently proposed criteria for the inclusion of an ontology in the Open 
Biomedical Ontologies Foundry depend upon the ability to determine that two ontologies overlap 
or characterize the “same domain”, and important questions arise concerning what it means for 
one ontology to be “better than” another in a given domain,  whether and to what degree two 
ontologies may be “merged”, and whether a methodological goal should be to strive for a single 
“convergent” ontology in a domain or rather to permit or to encourage multiple ontologies that 
may be incompatible with one another.  The problems and questions here are not purely formal or 
technical, but invite analysis and explication on the basis of such classic metaphysical orientations 
as realism, conceptualism, and nominalism.  And answers to these questions can have direct 
consequences for what is regarded as “good ontology” in science, what is hence regarded as “good 
science”, and what research proposals my be supported by funding agencies.9 
 
4. Ontological skills and the philosopher's role 
Having seen the problems in scientific ontology that should be of interest to the philosopher and to 
which philosophy may hope to make significant contributions, we are immediately confronted 
with the question concerning by what warrant or authority the philosopher may seek to participate 
in the practice of science in order to propose solutions to such problems.  In short, why should we 
expect scientists pay any attention to philosophers at all? 
 
Part of the answer to this question is that, with respect to contributing to scientific methodology — 
in the contemporary context of large computer, database, and software knowledge systems — the 
philosophical ontologist is in a position no different from that of the mathematician, statistician, or 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussion.  Moreover, as a consequence of the debate it became obvious to at least some of the 
participants that certain fundamental positions in metaphysics and philosophy of science (e.g., 
various sorts of “realism”) could quite dramatically affect both methodological principles and 
policies that one was inclined to adopt or to proffer as requirements in the context of practicing 
science.  For a similar illustration, see the exchange in OBO 2010 that was stimulated by 
Dumontier and Hoehndorf 2010 and Merrill 2010a. 
 
9  For some insight into issues pertaining to the characterizations of scientific ontologies, 
their comparability and commensurability, and how an appeal to philosophical positions may be 
relevant to such concerns and their consequences, see Euzenat  and Shvaiko 2007. Merrill 2008, 
2009, 2010a, 2010b, Smith and Ceusters 2010, Dumontier and Hohendorf  2010,  Lord and 
Stevens 2010, and Kutz et al 2010. 
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computer scientist.  In the case of each of these disciplines there is a certain core knowledge 
(pertaining to useful concepts, theories, techniques, and methods) that is applicable to empirical 
science and without which empirical science cannot function.  Mathematics and statistics (with the 
related field of probability theory) have been playing such a role for centuries.  But only within the 
latter half of the twentieth century has computer science developed as a distinct discipline, and 
only within that period has it had an effect on the practice of science — to the degree that it is now 
inconceivable that science should progress without it.  If mathematics is the language of science, 
then computer science has become its engine. 
 
However, these are formal disciplines and so it seems natural that they should be applied to the 
problems of science.  What about philosophy?  Philosophy is one of the humanities, and not a 
formal discipline at all.  How can it hope to contribute to science?  But this view of philosophy is 
both too narrow and a significant misperception.  While a number of areas of classical philosophy 
cannot reasonably be characterized as being of a formal nature, certainly others can.  Metaphysics 
in the tradition of western philosophy, and particularly ontology, is one of these, and is 
substantially a formal discipline — even if its theories and analyses have traditionally been 
expressed in natural language.  Certainly Aristotle's goal was to formalize — in one way or 
another — what we know and how we know it, and as part of this, what there is and how it is 
organized.  In this respect philosophy (and particularly ontology) has no less claim to scientific 
relevance than do mathematics, statistics, and computer science.  And in order to have its broadest 
and deepest effect on natural science, computer science needs philosophical ontology no less than 
philosophical ontology needs computer science.  In the crucible of contemporary empirical 
science, computer and software systems serve as laboratories for ontological theories and 
methodologies, lending empirical content and practical effect to those theories and methodologies. 
 
Somewhat oddly, philosophers have never been particularly adept at elucidating any special skills 
they may have.  In discussions of philosophical skills, the first mentioned are always logic, the 
construction and criticism of arguments, and analytical skills (usually in conjunction with 
“conceptual analysis”) in a sense that is never made abundantly clear.  Then reference is made to 
the ability to read and understand, to communicate, and to solve problems.  The litany of these 
skills, alas, does not appear to be distinctively philosophical.  What is it about the training of a 
philosopher that is distinctive and provides him or her with the sort of skills and the access to 
methods that are of critical importance in contributing to the use of ontologies in the sciences? 
 
Regardless of any particular interest in philosophy (be it metaphysics, logic, ethics, epistemology, 
philosophy of science, etc.), in acquiring one's bona fides a substantial amount of time is devoted 
to the study of the history of philosophy and of a broad variety of philosophical systems.  Why is 
this so?  Physicists, chemists, and biologists study little of the history of their disciplines.  How 
many chemists, for example, know what phlogiston is and what were its properties and the 
experiments confirming these?  How would such knowledge, in the normal course of science, help 
a chemist?  Scientists, as part of their education and training at least, do not study their mistakes.  
Why devote time to studying concepts and theories that were wrong?  Science advances, and with 
it, scientists.  Yet philosophers dwell on their mistakes (or at least the mistakes of their 
predecessors and their contemporaries).  And all philosophers know (to at least some degree) 
Plato's theory of forms, what its role was, what problems it addressed, difficulties that it presented, 
and how Aristotle's approach was a response to these.  Again, why devote so much time and effort 
to the study of analyses and theories that are conceded to be mistaken?  But the answer is simple:  
because this is where the skills come from.  And this is why scientists — unless they are trained 
also specifically as philosophers — in large part lack those skills. 
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Ontology is oriented towards the definition, characterization, and solution of problems.  Virtually 
all philosophers agree on this, and it is clearly expressed by Russell, Taylor, Leibniz, and Peirce.  
It leads to the development of methods and the definition of a set of problems, some of which have 
been enumerated above in relation to the use of ontology in science, and others which are well-
known to philosophers (such as the problem of universals or the problem of change).  In this 
regard, ontology is similar — in its relation to the sciences — to mathematics.  The domain of 
ontology has to do with what exists (with the very concept of existence) and how existents are 
related to one another.  An ontology then functions as a model of reality (or a significant portion of 
such a model); and to a scientist, ontology can be seen as the modeling of reality — or at least an 
ontology can be seen as an essential component of building a model of reality in the same way that 
mathematical models are models of reality.  Moreover, the ontology underlies the mathematical 
models and provides them with an interpretation and meaning they otherwise lack.10  Ontological 
modeling in science (often confusingly referred to as “conceptual modeling” by computer and 
information scientists) is then more fundamental than mathematical modeling since its result is the 
basic structure to which mathematical modeling is applied and on which theories are built. 
 
Consequently, one way of accurately describing skills that philosophers have in ontology and 
metaphysics — skills that are recognized by scientists as relevant to their own work — is to say 
that these are skills of modeling, model construction, and the analysis, comparison, and criticism 
of models.  Such a description is offered by Guarino and Musen in the inaugural issue of Applied 
Ontology: 
 
The advent of model-driven architectures in software engineering, of model-
based approaches for information integration, and of terminological standards 
for the annotation of experimental data in the sciences has brought the notion of 
ontology to the center of attention in a range of disciplines. ... 
 
We find it remarkable that an activity that traces its origins to the work of 
philosophers who lived more than two millennia ago has become central to the 
development of modern information technology.  We find it exciting to be able 
to articulate broadly applicable principles for ontological analysis and to see 
how to apply them in new domains.  We believe it is essential to look at the 
details of how modeling may have been done in particular domains and in 
particular situations in order to extract those generalizable principles.  (Guarino 
and Musen 2005, p. 2) 
 
But it should not be at all remarkable that the work and skills of philosophers have become central 
to the development of modern information technology and, further, to the progress of science.  The 
critical skills include those drawn from logic (including modal, intensional, and non-standard 
logics where applicable), but they also include skills from semantics and the philosophy of 
language (distinctions of use and mention, theories of reference and meaning, the semantics of 
names and descriptions), epistemology (confirmation, support, refutation, and counterexamples), 
philosophy of science (theory structure, theoretical terms, and criteria for the acceptance and 
rejection of theories), and metaphysics (particularly the problem of universals, the one and the 
                                                     
10  This is a commonly recognized problem in the case of statistical models and data 
mining, and is often referred to as the problem of the interpretability of data.  For an example of 
how an ontology is employed to address this problem see Liu et al 2007. 
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many, identity over time).  Those skills come, in part, from the philosopher's study of logic and 
argumentation; but in greater part they come from study and analysis of the prior work of 
philosophers in constructing and criticizing competing models of reality across two millennia. 
 
What will be the consequences if philosophers fail to assume this responsibility to participate 
actively in the development of scientific ontologies?  There are several.  First, as Hofweber and 
others fear, the scope and import of ontology in philosophy will shrivel and become of little or no 
interest outside of philosophy itself.  The ontological work traditionally done by the 
philosophically trained and sophisticated will be performed by others.  Meta-ontology will remain 
within philosophy proper, but the sort of ontological research and contributions championed by 
Peirce, Leibniz, and even Aristotle will move elsewhere.  Beyond this disciplinary consequence, 
there will be more practical effects because we can expect the preponderance of applied scientific 
ontology to be done by the poorly trained and informed.  Already there is significant evidence of 
such an effect where the philosophically unsophisticated have based ontological work on a poor or 
incomplete grasp of fundamentals.11  Along these lines we should note that within the domain of 
informatics it has become quite popular to repeat an observation of Andrew Collier that “the 
alternative to philosophy is not no philosophy, but bad philosophy” (Collier 1994, p. 17), and so 
there is a growing realization within the scientific informatics community itself of both the value 
of philosophy and the need for direct participation of the philosophically skilled in ontological 
work. 
 
5. Participating in science 
The remaining questions concerning the participation model of philosophical ontologists in 
science are:  What are the details of the mechanism of this participation?  And what are the 
consequences of this for how philosophical ontologists must approach their work and teaching?  
We may begin by identifying several different types or levels of participation for philosophical 
ontologists in the practice and teaching of science.  First among these is the level of organizational 
participation that requires the philosopher to participate actively in scientific rather than purely 
philosophical organizations.  Some examples here, oriented specifically towards ontology, include 
the International Association for Ontology and Its Applications (IAOA), the International 
Conference on Formal Ontology in Information Systems (FOIS), The International Conference on 
Biomedical Ontologies (ICBO),  the National Center for Ontological Research (NCOR), the 
American Association for Artificial Intelligence (AAAI),  the American Medical Informatics 
Association (AMIA), the European Federation of Medical Informatics (EFMI), ONTOLOG, and 
the Open Ontology Repository (OOR) — though there are a number of others as well.  Interaction 
with such organizations will not only provide the philosopher with detailed information 
concerning recognized problems and research projects, but will in addition provide rich sources of 
further education and opportunities for participation in new or continuing projects of an 
ontological nature. 
 
This leads to the next level of participation in the form of direct contributions to research and 
development in scientific ontologies, and two avenues of participation are open.  First, of course, is 
the route of refereed publications or presentations at conferences.  But the choice of venue is 
critical here since in order for the philosophical ontologist to have any effect on science his or her 
                                                     
11  There are now numerous instances of such cases, and criticisms of such attempts.  For 
examples and further literature references, see  Ceusters and Smith 2007,  Merrill 2008,  and  
Smith  2004. 
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work must be seen and understood by scientists.  And this means publishing and presenting 
research results outside of those venues traditionally recognized as appropriate for academic 
philosophers.  In addition to conferences of those organizations mentioned above, examples of 
journals to be considered for such research include Applied Ontology, the Journal of the American 
Medical Informatics Association, the International Journal of Medical Informatics, the 
International Journal of Metadata, Semantics and Ontologies, the Journal of Data Semantics, and 
a variety of journals in the areas of artificial intelligence, human/computer studies, computer 
science, and machine learning. 
 
Publishing in such venues will confront the philosophical ontologist with some unfamiliar 
challenges.  The first of these results from the fact that in general science proceeds more quickly 
than philosophy in terms of both the pace of research and the dissemination of results.  Partly as a 
consequence of this, and partly as a consequence of the manner in which scientific results 
historically have been reported, the philosophical ontologist will find it necessary to adapt to a 
different style of publishing and, typically, to the publication of shorter, somewhat less 
argumentative, and differently structured presentations. 
 
Additionally, a significant difference in the research and intellectual cultures between philosophy 
and science is that contemporary scientists now pursue their work almost exclusively in teams, 
where each member of the team may be responsible for a particular set of tasks or area of 
expertise.  It is relatively unusual for philosophers to collaborate on research (beyond at times co-
authoring papers or books), and it is unheard of for philosophers to collaborate to the degree and 
in the manner that this is demanded by contemporary science.  In turn, the different style and 
venues for publications and presentations required under the strong participation model may 
present difficulties for traditional philosophy departments and university administrations in 
evaluating the professional significance of scientifically meaningful work done by the 
philosophical ontologist.  There indeed may be a tendency to regard such work as “not 
philosophy” or “not of philosophical interest”, but at base this may be seen as a tacit acceptance of 
the evolution model, the grounding model, or the overlap model and a rejection of the kind of 
substantive systematic ontology traditionally practiced by philosophers. 
 
The issue of collaboration and the resulting multiply-authored publications and research studies 
are only one example of difficulties in applying traditional criteria for promotion and tenure, for 
example, to philosophers seeking to pursue the strong participation model.12  This is the basis for 
one argument in support of Barry Smith's view that it is time for ontology to — in a disciplinary 
sense — break from philosophy and found its own independent departments:  philosophers, and 
                                                     
12  This is not, it must be conceded, a problem only for philosophy.  The problem of 
multiply-authored publications and the determination of a particular team member's contributions 
has become so extreme in some cases that in recent years professional scientific organizations 
have adopted stronger and more explicit criteria for inclusion in an authorship list, and have 
imposed more severe constraints on the number of authors that may be listed for a single paper.  
However, while scientific departments are accustomed to dealing with these issues, departments of 
philosophy and schools of humanities generally are not.  Moreover, in the humanities – and 
certainly in philosophy – requirements for tenure and promotion are often phrased explicitly in 
terms of “singly-authored papers” where in the natural sciences such papers are relatively 
uncommon (and in fact the ability to work with colleagues in research and publishing on a regular 
basis  is explicitly valued, if not required). 
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particularly young philosophers, will not be able to succeed on a professional academic level if 
they devote any substantial amount of their effort to participation in the area of scientific 
ontologies.  However, I think that there is too much to be lost — both  for philosophy and for 
science — in following the evolution model in this case.  But a direct consequence of this is that 
as we must clearly acknowledge the importance of traditional philosophy in the teaching and 
practice of scientific ontology, we must as well acknowledge the need for university departments 
and administrations to recognize the contributions of philosophical ontologists outside of areas 
and venues traditionally recognized as appropriate for academic philosophers. 
 
This last point brings us to the third level of participation for philosophical ontologists in applied 
scientific ontology: pedagogical participation.  If the participation model is to be adopted and 
pursued, then this requires also a change in how ontology is taught and the audience to whom it is 
addressed since we must acknowledge a responsibility for training both new generations of 
philosophers and new generations of scientists in philosophical ontology, scientific ontology, and 
the relations between these.  Yet if we look at contemporary curricula in philosophy we find few 
courses addressed to this need.13 
 
The requirements for curriculum change in this regard are several, and we must begin with the 
realization that there are somewhat disparate groups of students to be served.  It is natural to think 
of graduate students in philosophy, and particularly those specializing in such areas as logic, 
metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of language.  These students can be presumed 
already to have a substantial background in philosophy and to be prepared for more specific and 
directed work in applied ontology.  But another rich source of students is undergraduates — in 
either philosophy or the sciences — who may be interested in graduate study or careers in applied 
ontology or related areas.  Finally, there is an important audience to be found among graduate 
students or post-doctoral students in the sciences (particularly in computer science, information 
science, and the biological and medical sciences), and this audience is especially open to acquiring 
the philosophical sophistication and skills that will aid them in dealing with the creation and use of 
scientific ontologies. 
 
This realization of the need for educating such distinct groups of students (though they share some 
common interests and goals) then calls for the creation of specific applied ontology courses that 
may be offered on a regular basis and that provide or extend the necessary training in 
philosophical ontology into its applications in scientific ontology.  Traditional courses in 
metaphysics, logic, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science cannot be extended to 
cover this need; and such traditional courses will still be required in order to provide philosophical 
ontologists their unique perspective and set of ontological skills, and to serve in a background and 
foundational manner for courses in applied ontology.  But it is likewise not sufficient to retreat to 
                                                     
13  Some courses appear at the State University of New York at Buffalo and North Carolina 
State University.  Although the Indiana University School of Informatics and Computing was 
founded by two philosophers — J. Michael Dunn and Myles Brand — it contains no courses with 
distinctively philosophical content and does not list philosophy as one of its cognate areas 
(integrated programs of courses outside of the school).  Courses in applied ontology — some with 
philosophical content — appear under the auspices of the Laboratory for Applied Ontology of the 
Institute of Cognitive Science and Technology in Trento, Italy; but these are graduate or post-
doctoral in nature and are not taught by philosophers (though the instructors tend to be 
philosophically sophisticated). 
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a diffusion model, hoping or assuming that those interested in applied ontology will get their 
training in traditional courses and somehow figure out how to make use of what they learn there 
when they turn to participating in applied ontology.  A model for this sort of curriculum expansion 
in philosophy may be found in the inclusion of programs in medical ethics, business ethics, and 
engineering ethics in recent decades. 
 
The concern of Russell and Hofweber is that 
 
... the questions that metaphysics tries to answer have long been answered in 
other parts of inquiry, ones that have much greater authority.  And if they 
haven't been answered yet then one should not look to philosophy for an answer.  
What metaphysics tries to do has been or will be done by the sciences.  There is 
nothing left to do for philosophy, or so the worry.  (Hofweber 2009, p. 160) 
 
But we can concede the cogency of part of this concern without conceding the ultimate 
consequence it paints for philosophy and ontology — provided that we understand not only the 
conceptual, but the practical relationship between the philosophical ontologist and science.  It has 
always been true (at least since the time of Aristotle) that a significant part of what metaphysics 
tries to do has been done by the sciences.  But it does not follow from this that it has not also been 
done by philosophy, nor that the ability of science in this regard is independent of philosophy (and 
this is true in both a conceptual and a practical sense).  And indeed the work of philosophical 
ontologists — in direct collaboration with scientists — is now, more than ever, critical to the 
progress of science. 
 
The strong participation model advocated here is distinguished from other views concerning the 
relation of philosophical ontology to science in several important ways.  Chief among these, 
perhaps, is that it retains within philosophy a substantive or systematic kind of ontology — one 
represented by Aristotle, Leibniz, and Peirce, among many others — rather than abandoning the 
practice and foundations of such a discipline to other domains, and rather than retreating to the 
practice only of meta-ontology coupled to problems of “what exists” whose solutions are of no 
interest outside a narrow community of philosophical ontologists.  Instead, it views applied 
ontology (including the development of ontological methodology and the application of that 
methodology) as both a central component of metaphysics and a central component of 
contemporary science; and it assigns to the philosophical ontologist a significant responsibility in 
ensuring that the scientific applications of ontology are both adequate and correct.  The strong 
participation model answers questions about the practical value of metaphysics and ontology, and  
it has consequences for the practice and teaching of ontology as these are approached by 
philosophers.  The strong participation model also saves ontology for philosophy in a meaningful 
way that the other models cannot, although its more significant goal and effect is to save 
philosophical ontology in philosophy for the benefit of both philosophy and the sciences. 
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